The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for Protecting Consumers’ Personal Information by Marcus, Daniel J.
MARCUS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018 5:20 PM 
 
Notes 
THE DATA BREACH DILEMMA: PROACTIVE 
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ABSTRACT 
  Data breaches are an increasingly common part of consumers’ lives. 
No institution is immune to the possibility of an attack. Each breach 
inevitably risks the release of consumers’ personally identifiable 
information and the strong possibility of identity theft.  
  Unfortunately, current solutions for handling these incidents are 
woefully inadequate. Private litigation like consumer class actions and 
shareholder lawsuits each face substantive legal and procedural 
barriers. States have their own data security and breach notification 
laws, but there is currently no unifying piece of legislation or strong 
enforcement mechanism.  
  This Note argues that proactive solutions are required. First, a 
national data security law—setting minimum data security standards, 
regulating the use and storage of personal information, and expanding 
the enforcement role of the Federal Trade Commission—is imperative 
to protect consumers’ data. Second, a proactive solution requires 
reconsidering how to minimize the problem by going to its source: the 
collection of personally identifiable information in the first place. This 
Note suggests regulating companies’ collection of Social Security 
numbers, and, eventually, using a system based on distributed ledger 
technology to replace the ubiquity of Social Security numbers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a high probability that your financial and personal 
information—name, address, Social Security number, birth date, and 
more—has been stolen. On September 7, 2017, the credit reporting 
agency Equifax1 announced that its database had been hacked, 
potentially compromising sensitive information of approximately 143 
million American consumers2—meaning that the breach affected 
about 44 percent of the population.3 Four months prior to Equifax’s 
announcement, hackers exploited a bug in the company’s software and 
gained access to its entire internal system.4 While a patch was available 
in March 2017, former Equifax CEO Richard Smith blamed a single 
individual for failing to take any action to patch the bug.5 Additionally, 
a routine scan of the security system failed to detect the vulnerability.6 
This left Equifax’s entire centralized database of financial and personal 
information wide-open to an attack. 
The Equifax breach has drawn heightened attention to the 
prevalence of data breaches and the security issues that inevitably 
follow. Recent data breaches of companies like Facebook, Target, 
Home Depot, Yahoo, and even the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, have exposed millions of individuals’ sensitive personal 
information.7 However, unlike Facebook or Yahoo users, consumers 
 
 1. Equifax is one of three major credit reporting bureaus in the United States, which 
aggregate the financial and personal information of consumers. Stacey Cowley & Tara Siegel 
Bernard, As Equifax Amassed Ever More Data, Safety Was a Sales Pitch, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 
2017), https://nyti.ms/2yj1M4Y [https://perma.cc/A3XX-9S2N]. Equifax uses this information to 
create credit reports and profiles that are analyzed and sold to businesses—including banks, credit 
card companies, and employers—to determine individuals’ financial risk. Id. 
 2. Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says 
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2xS95kJ [https://perma.cc/3BMP-N6GZ]. Since then, this number has been 
reestimated at approximately 145.5 million. Stacy Cowley, 2.5 Million More People Potentially 
Exposed in Equifax Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xPEFA2 
[https://perma.cc/KGH4-N79A].  
 3. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
popclock/ [https://perma.cc/8TUS-36SU]. If we assume that the breach primarily affected adults, 
this percentage would be higher because there are approximately 254 million people over the age 
of eighteen in the U.S. See id. 
 4. Tara Siegel Bernard & Stacy Cowley, Equifax Breach Caused by Lone Employee’s Error, 
Former C.E.O. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2yFriRZ [https://perma.cc/9A78-
LH8T]. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50 Million 
Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OmvHom [https://perma.cc/BH4E-3BCE]; 
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cannot “opt-out” of the credit reporting industry and therefore have 
little control over their data.8 Although there is already some industry 
regulation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,9 the Equifax breach 
prompted congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle to quickly 
express their support for stricter standards of privacy.10 Despite the 
alarm raised by several high-profile breaches, consumers have become 
so accustomed to these incidents that a term has been coined to 
describe their prevalence and the resulting ennui: “data breach 
fatigue.”11  
Yet, there are myriad reasons to be wary of the growing frequency 
of data breaches. The Ponemon Institute, an independent research 
center that conducts yearly data breach analyses, estimated that there 
were, on average, 130 successful breaches per company in 2017.12 This 
is a 27 percent increase from 2016, translating into an average cost of 
$11.7 million per organization for cybercrime attacks.13 For consumers, 
this inevitably increases the possibility of identity theft and fraud if 
personal information is exposed in the breaches. According to one 
study, 16.7 million U.S. consumers fell prey to identity fraud in 2017, 
resulting in approximately $16.8 billion stolen.14 Identity fraud schemes 
 
Keith Collins, Yahoo and Equifax Just Proved That You Can Never Trust the First Number 
Announced in a Data Breach, QUARTZ (Oct. 23, 2017), https://qz.com/1093399/the-equifax-efx-
and-yahoo-hacks-are-further-proof-that-you-should-never-trust-the-first-number-announced-in-
a-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/MRU9-BVW8].  
 8. Bernard & Cowley, supra note 4; see also Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of 
Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 47, 48 (2003) (providing further insight 
on the credit reporting industry and consumer rights). 
 9. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)). 
 10. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Michael Rapoport & Christina Rexrode, Senators 
Rip Credit-Reporting Model in Wake of Equifax Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct.  
4, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senators-rip-credit-reporting-model-in-wake-of-equifax-
breach-1507136171 [https://perma.cc/X9H2-456R]. 
 11. See Elise Hu, I Feel Nothing: The Home Depot Hack and Data Breach Fatigue, NPR 
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/03/345539074/i-feel-
nothing-the-home-depot-hack-and-data-breach-fatigue [https://perma.cc/745Q-CQYX] 
(discussing the disillusionment that consumers feel when retailers are hacked and credit card 
information is exposed).   
 12. PONEMON INST. & ACCENTURE, 2017 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: INSIGHTS IN THE 
SECURITY INVESTMENTS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 4 (2017), https://www.accenture. 
com/t20171006T095146Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-62/Accenture-2017CostCybercrime-US-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E2N-MZUV].  
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST. (2018), 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime [https://perma.cc/ 
26KB-5MQK]. These statistics are overall identity fraud figures and not solely based on identity 
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include employment fraud, tax fraud, credit card fraud, and creating 
new accounts.15 For reference, when the state of Utah suffered a major 
data breach in 2012 that exposed 800,000 Utahans’ personal 
information, an independent research agency estimated that more than 
120,000 cases of fraud would result.16 The agency projected the breach 
would cost each individual “more than $3,300 in losses, on average” 
with about “20 hours and $770 on lawyers and time lost from work to 
resolve the case.”17  
Former FBI Director Robert Mueller, speaking at a cyber security 
conference in 2012, presciently summarized the data breach landscape 
when he said, “there are only two types of companies: those that have 
been hacked and those that will be.”18 Assuming Mueller is correct and 
data breaches are inevitable, the question then becomes: What 
measures can be taken to minimize the risk of consumers’ personal 
information being exposed by these attacks?  
In the private sector, companies are responsible for safeguarding 
their customers’ data and implementing adequate cybersecurity 
measures to prevent future attacks.19 However, a study in the Harvard 
Business Review noted that “[d]irectors acknowledge cybersecurity as 
 
fraud resulting from data breaches. Id. While some consider identity theft the unauthorized access 
to personal information and identity fraud the unauthorized use of that information for illicit gain, 
this Note will treat the two as interchangeable based on the Department of Justice’s 
understanding of the terms. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 15. Id. The Consumer Sentinel Network, which is maintained by the Federal Trade 
Commission and tracks consumer fraud and identity theft complaints, reported almost 2.7 million 
complaints in 2017. 2017 FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 3, 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2017/ 
consumer_sentinel_data_book_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y44-PNMQ]. The reports were 
divided between fraud (1.1 million), identity theft (371,000), and other (1.2 million). Id. 
 16. Ann Carrns, The Cost to Consumers of a Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS (Apr.  
30, 2013), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/the-cost-to-consumers-of-a-data-breach/ 
[https://perma.cc/QV94-A4UM ].  
 17. Id. 
 18. Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Speech at  
the RSA Cyber Security Conference in San Francisco (Mar. 1,  
2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/speeches/combating-threats-in-the-cyber-world-
outsmarting-terrorists-hackers-and-spies [https://perma.cc/4ND8-2UZK]. 
 19. See, e.g., BANK OF AMERICA, U.S. Consumer Privacy Notice (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/consumer-privacy-notice.go [https://perma.cc/L34U-
KZHJ] (“To protect your personal information from unauthorized access and use, we use security 
measures that comply with federal law. These measures include computer safeguards and secured 
files and buildings.”); see also Enforcing Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE  
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/ 
enforcing-privacy-promises [https://perma.cc/2C4F-7L4S] (listing recent FTC enforcement 
actions against companies for violating, among other things, privacy policies). 
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an urgent global issue, but are failing to make the connection between 
the pervasiveness of cyberthreats and their companies’ 
vulnerabilities.”20 Most companies only discover deficiencies in their 
security systems following a data breach. Private parties then turn to 
litigation to bring claims for damages stemming from the breach and to 
demand better cybersecurity practices. For example, consumers may 
bring class action lawsuits or shareholders may bring securities fraud 
class actions and derivative suits.21  
However, each of these litigation strategies face legal obstacles. 
Class action lawsuits are marred by standing problems due to a circuit 
split on the issue of what constitutes injury from a data breach.22 When 
a company’s stock price drops after a data breach, shareholders 
bringing securities fraud class actions have trouble demonstrating that 
they “relied to their detriment on a company’s material 
misrepresentations” stemming from public statements and 10-K 
filings.23 And derivative shareholder suits—targeting corporate boards 
and directors for allegedly breaching their fiduciary duties—are 
difficult to prove because of the high bar for successfully pleading 
demand futility and the power of the business judgment rule in 
Delaware courts.24  
In the public sector, the regulatory framework for data breaches 
is comprised of a patchwork of rules and limited enforcement 
mechanisms. Hackers penetrate companies’ computer systems to steal 
such precious data as financial information, trade secrets, or personally 
identifiable information (“PII”). In doing so, they violate numerous 
federal and state laws, like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.25 In 
the medical field, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
 
 20. J. Yo-Jud Cheng & Boris Groysberg, Why Boards Aren’t Dealing with Cyberthreats, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/why-boards-arent-dealing-with-
cyberthreats [https://perma.cc/96S4-R9M3]. 
 21. See Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now You’re Being Sued: 
The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. B.J. 30, 30 (2016) (listing common 
types of cybersecurity breach litigation). 
 22. Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017). 
 23. Hooker & Pill, supra note 21, at 32. 
 24. For further discussion of shareholder derivative suits, see infra Part II.A.2.  
 25. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98–473, 
98 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). See also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., 97-1025, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD 
AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 1 (2014). 
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Act of 199626 (“HIPAA”) sets standards for storing medical 
information.27 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act28 (“GLBA”) does the 
same for financial institutions using clients’ nonpublic personal 
information.29 Notably, there is no comprehensive national data 
security law. Instead, state attorneys general may charge companies for 
violating various state laws. All fifty states have data security laws, but 
most states only set standards for notifying consumers after data 
breaches.30 Finally, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), as the 
primary agency tasked with consumer protection, may bring 
enforcement actions against companies failing to safeguard consumer 
data.31 While these actions may result in companies instituting new 
corporate governance practices or paying penalties, the FTC has 
remained conservative in its enforcement approach.32  
Most of these remedies are retroactive. Though the fear of 
lawsuits may trigger some companies to institute cybersecurity 
reforms, drastic changes are needed to ensure that consumers’ personal 
and financial information remains protected from increasing exposure. 
As companies continue to amass consumer information, and the effects 
of data breaches are magnified, this vulnerability has become a 
pressing public issue requiring immediate legislation.  
This Note expands on the growing literature of proactive solutions 
in the wake of increasing data breaches, and argues that the current 
measures for dealing with data breaches are deeply inadequate. 
Instead of ex ante solutions, a forward-looking federal data security 
statute is imperative for protecting consumers’ personal information. 
This statute should be modeled after laws such as HIPAA and GLBA, 
establish minimum cybersecurity standards, and detail best practices 
for companies that store consumer data. But this only addresses one 
 
 26. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104–
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 .  
 28. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809. 
 30. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Mar. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/KCD8-6K6Q]. 
 31. See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2231 (2015) (discussing the developing regulatory role 
of the FTC). 
 32. See id. at 2235–36 (“Political considerations and the newness of privacy and data security 
issues may justifiably explain the FTC’s modest approach.”). 
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side of an admittedly complex issue—that of the companies who are 
already in possession of PII. A proactive solution also requires 
reconsidering how to minimize this growing problem by going to its 
source: the collection of PII in the first place. This Note will touch on 
two potential proactive solutions. One such solution is legislation 
regulating companies’ collection and use of Social Security numbers 
(“SSNs”), which have arguably become the most valuable piece of PII. 
A second option is creating a decentralized, yet more secure system of 
identification—utilizing blockchain or a similar distributed ledger 
technology—to better protect consumers and provide them greater 
control over their data.33  
Part I introduces the issues surrounding the exposure of personal 
data like Social Security numbers in data breaches. Part II expands on 
the current private and public regulatory framework in response to 
these breaches. These reactionary mechanisms have become 
ineffectual for instituting noticeable changes in this field. Finally, Part 
III argues that a federal data security statute is necessary and provides 
a better solution than the current patchwork of state laws. It also 
engages with two options for mitigating companies’ reliance on Social 
Security numbers as personal identifiers.  
I.  DATA BREACHES AND THE VALUE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
As the number of successful data breaches continues to rise, the 
risk to consumers’ personal and financial information increases. Data 
breaches occur when “an individual name plus a Social Security 
number, driver’s license number, medical record or financial record 
(credit/debit cards included) is potentially put at risk because of 
exposure” through either electronic or paper means.34 According to the 
Identity Theft Resource Center, 9,395 data breaches were documented 
in the U.S. between January 1, 2005 and September 30, 2018, which 
 
 33. This solution aligns with the ongoing academic conversation about cyber privacy and 
how companies store and protect data. See, e.g., Julia N. Mehlman, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie, 
It’s Going to Ask for Your Personally Identifiable Information: A Look at the Data-Collection 
Industry and a Proposal for Recognizing the Value of Consumer Information, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 
329, 329 (2015) (examining the lack of regulation surrounding the data-collection industry and 
data brokers in general); Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your 
Data?: A New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. REG. 667, 691 (2017) 
(discussing the ability of individuals to buy consumer information and the resulting privacy 
harms). 
 34. Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/Data-
Breaches/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/M6AG-RXBQ].  
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resulted in the exposure of more than one billion records.35 These 
breaches are not confined to specific industries, but include attacks on 
banks, retailers, entertainment companies, healthcare providers, and 
even the federal government.36 
There is no escaping the reality that personal data is the “new 
oil”—a valuable resource that has developed into a uniquely coveted 
asset.37 Modern companies control troves of data containing 
consumers’ PII. The literature on data brokers—companies that 
maintain personal data to analyze, package, and sell to marketers and 
other companies for targeting existing and potential customers—is 
extensive and growing in academia and through governmental 
inquiry.38 Consumers can benefit from the increased accumulation of 
data by receiving personalized marketing experiences and innovative 
product offerings.39 However, the same consumers have little control 
over how this information is utilized because most data brokers are not 
consumer-facing and their control over this data may diminish 
consumers’ ability to seek insights into how their data is being used, 
 
 35. Records may include SSNs, credit/debit card numbers, protected health information, etc. 
Id. These data breach figures are based on the Identity Theft Resource Center’s analysis of 
breaches “confirmed by various media sources and/or lists from state government agencies.” Id. 
Of course, it remains a challenge to correctly assess the exact number of yearly data breaches. 
This information may not be regularly released and some companies may only publicly disclose a 
breach months after the incident.  
 36. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at Roger Williams University 
School of Law Symposium: “Cybersecurity + Law Enforcement: The Cutting Edge” (Oct. 16, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-
remarks-cybersecurity-law [https://perma.cc/XP4L-RAVD].  
 37. Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 
2011), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A67V-ESRX] (quoting Meglena Kuneva, European Consumer Commissioner 
(Mar. 2009)).  
 38. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR  
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY i (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MXD-SHF7] (reporting on the data 
collection practices of nine data brokers to shed light on the industry); MAJORITY STAFF OF S. 
COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKERS 
INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES i 
(2013), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-
a631-08f2f255b577l [https://perma.cc/AF4M-FURJ] (focusing on the collection and sale of data 
for marketing purposes); Mehlman, supra note 33, at 331–32 (defining data brokers and their 
ability to easily collect and sell personal information). 
 39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 38, at v. 
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and to modify that usage.40 Companies have few incentives to change 
these practices because, in the aggregate, this information is worth 
billions; JPMorgan Chase estimated that a “unique user was worth $4 
to Facebook and $24 to Google.”41 And SEC filings put Facebook’s 
figure closer to $120 per user.42 In short, personal information has 
become big business.  
As the accumulation and commercialization of arguably 
innocuous personal information, such as our spending patterns or 
“Likes” on Facebook, becomes controversial,43 it follows that the mass 
collection of SSNs is even more problematic. SSNs are nearly-universal 
identifiers used by government agencies and businesses alike for 
record-keeping and financial monitoring.44 In 1935, the Social Security 
Act was passed to establish a national system of old-age benefits.45 The 
SSN was created to “uniquely identify U.S. workers, enabling 
employers to submit accurate reports of covered earnings for use in 
administering benefits under the new Social Security program.”46 
Thirty-five million Americans received SSNs as a result of the original 
push by the Social Security Administration.47 
However, the role of SSNs has expanded far beyond its original 
singularly intended use.48 SSNs have become “skeleton keys,” swiftly 
opening the door to identity theft following data breaches, which may 
 
 40. Id. at vi (commenting on data brokers’ lack of transparency and noting that “even those 
consumers who know who the data brokers are, find their websites, and take the time to find the 
opt out and use it may still not know its limitations”). 
 41. Joshua Brustein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a Price on Their Personal Data, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2vjGnK1 [https://perma.cc/4FUH-JUZA].  
 42. Id.  
 43. See, e.g., Andrew Prokop, Cambridge Analytica Shutting Down: The Firm’s Many 
Scandals, Explained, VOX (May 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 
2018/3/21/17141428/ cambridge-analyticar-trump-russia-mueller [https://perma.cc/9FAJ-QZGC] 
(detailing the Cambridge Analytica incident in which the British firm collected Facebook users’ 
personal information for politically-motivated reasons).  
 44. Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 
2, 2009, at 1, 55.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 57.  
 47. Id. at 59. This included the distribution of Social Security cards. Id. at 57. The first three 
digits of the SSN represented the area number (assigned by geographical region), the next two 
were the group number (related to the order assigned in each area), and the last four were the 
serial number (numerical series from 0001-9999). Id. On June 25, 2011, the Social Security 
Administration changed this assignment procedure to a randomized system. Social Security 
Number Randomization, SOC. SECURITY. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/employer/ 
randomization.html [https://perma.cc/3DBE-7T9Q]. 
 48. Puckett, supra note 44, at 69. 
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result in financial losses, detrimental impacts to credit scores, or even 
health insurance repercussions from fraudulently procured medical 
treatments.49 Since there are no broad restrictions in federal law 
limiting the use of SSNs by the private sector, businesses regularly use 
the number as a form of personal identification.50 While Social Security 
cards themselves have become resistant to counterfeiting, the number 
remains a “convenient means of identifying people in large systems of 
records.”51 Banks, credit card companies, employers, insurance 
agencies, schools, and even the local gym are just a few of the potential 
companies that may have a person’s SSN on file.52 Since data brokers 
buy and sell consumers’ information, there are likely countless other 
businesses that have access to consumers’ SSNs. To the surprise of 
many, these transactions may occur even if the consumer never 
authorized its disclosure to the selling party.53 There are even striking 
instances in which data brokers sold this information to scammers 
directly.54 
The ubiquity of the SSN as an identifier makes it a primary target 
for both hackers and identity thieves.55 Identity theft and fraud occur 
when someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s personal 
data, like a SSN, through fraud or deception for personal gain.56 When 
data breaches expose SSNs, thieves can use these numbers—usually 
combined with other pieces of data—to impersonate individuals and 
 
 49. Adam Levin, It’s 10 p.m. Do You Know Where Your Social Security Number Is?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-levin/its-10-pm-do-you-
know-whe_b_6118342.html [https://perma.cc/Q8TE-3NWR]. 
 50. Puckett, supra note 44, at 67.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Levin, supra note 49.  
 53. See Alex Schneider, How Could They Know That? Behind the Data That Facilitates 
Scams Against Vulnerable Americans, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 716, 717 (2015) (highlighting the 
dearth of regulation that allows data brokers to sell information without consumers’ knowledge 
or consent).  
 54. See, e.g., Data Broker Defendants Settle FTC Charges They Sold Sensitive Personal 
Information to Scammers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2016/02/data-broker-defendants-settle-ftc-charges-they-sold-
sensitive [https://perma.cc/XY23-QN5P] (describing a settlement against data brokers for 
knowingly selling the personal information of hundreds of thousands of consumers).  
 55. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social 
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (2008) 
(“There is no doubt that the social security number is central to the commission of the crime of 
identity theft.”).  
 56. What Are Identity Theft and Identity Fraud?, U.S. DEP’T. JUSTICE (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/identity-theft/identity-theft-and-identity-fraud [https:// 
perma.cc/7WP9-Z3FN]. 
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apply for loans, housing, utilities, or government benefits.57 
Additionally, this information may be sold on the black market to 
other hackers.58 To compound things further, the average cost for each 
lost or stolen record containing sensitive and confidential information 
is approximately $148 per company, because of costs ranging from 
hiring forensic experts and in-house investigation teams to providing 
free credit monitoring services for affected customers.59 While identity 
theft is illegal,60 it has become increasingly difficult to catch these 
thieves and subsequently prosecute them due to jurisdictional 
challenges and attribution issues when pursuing foreign hackers.61  
The high value placed on collecting personal information and its 
ubiquity in society amplify the potential harm caused by data breaches 
and identity theft. Until the collection, storage, and use of SSNs and 
other identifiers are controlled through regulation, personal 
information will likely continue to be unlawfully released.  
II.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The current legal and institutional framework for responding to 
and preventing data breaches is an expanding field. In the private 
sector, consumers and shareholders may file lawsuits against hacked 
companies to provoke changes in their data security systems and 
recover any damages from exposed personal information. However, 
these ex post responses invariably face procedural and substantive 
legal challenges. In the public sector, the federal options are only 
marginally better. There are existing mechanisms for holding 
companies accountable in specific fields, such as HIPAA and GLBA, 
 
 57. Craig Timberg, How Equifax Hackers Might Use Your Social Security Number to Pretend 
They’re You, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2017/09/08/how-equifax-hackers-might-use-your-social-security-number-to-pretend-
theyre-you/?utm_term=.c229b683d40f [https://perma.cc/D3CW-738H].  
 58. Id.; see also Keith Collins, Here’s What Your Stolen Identity Goes for on The Internet’s 
Black Market, QUARTZ (July 23, 2015), https://qz.com/460482/heres-what-your-stolen-identity-
goes-for-on-the-internets-black-market/ [https://perma.cc/98UD-FDNH] (analyzing the listings 
of personal information on a black-market website and concluding that the going rate for a stolen 
identity is about $20).  
 59. PONEMON INST. & IBM SEC., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY:  
GLOBAL OVERVIEW 8 (2018), https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/assets/ 
2018_Global_Cost_of_a_Data_Breach_Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/LUL6-VU7F]. 
 60. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012). 
 61. See Morgan Chalfant, Feds Find Some Foreign Hackers Are Out of Reach, HILL (Nov. 
29, 2017), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/362458-feds-find-some-foreign-hackers-are-out-
of-reach [https://perma.cc/ZKK8-V9QU] (discussing the challenges of attributing these attacks to 
specific individuals and then extraditing them to the U.S. to face criminal charges).  
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and limited enforcement options through the FTC. Some states, such 
as California, Massachusetts, and New York, are at the forefront of 
proactive data security and breach legislation. Nevertheless, because 
no uniform system exists, most companies are free to set their own 
standards for using personal information and responding to these 
breaches.  
A. Legal Hurdles of Private Litigation 
After a data breach, two potential avenues for recovery are 
consumer lawsuits and shareholder lawsuits. However, the law with 
respect to these private litigation options is still developing and 
remains uncertain, leaving them as unsatisfactory solutions to a 
growing crisis.  
1. Consumer Lawsuits.  Consumers regularly file a variety of 
lawsuits in the wake of data breaches.62 Class action lawsuits are the 
most publicized. However, issues persist because of the standing 
requirement under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.63 For a 
successful data breach claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she suffered an 
‘injury in fact,’ (2) her injuries were ‘fairly traceable’ to [the] 
defendant’s actions, and (3) a favorable judgment will redress her 
injuries.”64 This “injury-in-fact” must be “concrete and particularized” 
and “actual or imminent.”65 Even if personal information is exposed, 
the actual injury may not have occurred yet.66 To establish an injury, 
most courts have required allegations that the stolen data was used or 
 
 62. See Todd H. Greene, William A. Delgado & Nicole A. Diaz, A Crash-Course in Data-
Security Regulation and Litigation, 33 ACC DOCKET 92, 97–98 (2015) (examining potential 
federal claims based on the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act; state claims stemming from violations of state data privacy regulations and 
consumer protection statutes; and common law claims such as breach of contract, false 
advertising, and negligence). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. III.  
 64. Eric S. Boos, Chandler Givens & Nick Larry, Damages Theories in Data Breach 
Litigation, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 127 (2015) (citing Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 
1323 (11th Cir. 2012)).  
 65. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 66. See Boos et al., supra note 64, at 127 (noting that “actual identity theft and a resulting 
loss of money or property” may be absent following a breach). Based on the recent Supreme 
Court case, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 398 (2016), proving future injury 
has become extraordinarily difficult. See Dowty, supra note 22, at 687–88 (discussing the high 
burden for standing imposed by Clapper and noting that “[c]ourts have since used Clapper to 
dismiss data breach actions for failing to show a recognizable injury”). 
MARCUS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:20 PM 
2018] DATA BREACH DILEMMA 567 
its use was imminent.67 Given the difficulty in tracking stolen data after 
a breach, this requirement is a stringent one for plaintiffs to satisfy. 
In response, consumers have asserted alternative theories to prove 
injury. Some plaintiffs have successfully argued that data breaches 
caused injury through an increased risk of identity theft.68 However, 
other plaintiffs have not fared as well because many courts have been 
reluctant to find the increased risk of future harm sufficient for 
standing without allegations that the plaintiffs suffered any actual 
harm.69 For example, courts in the First and Third Circuits rejected this 
increased risk theory and have only recognized actual identity theft or 
fraud to confer standing.70 Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit a panel 
recently found that the plaintiffs’ allegations of harm from the 
increased risk of future identity theft “failed to establish a non-
speculative, imminent injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III 
standing.”71 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed a significant case regarding the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management breach based on similar reasoning.72 Thus, until the 
Supreme Court weighs in, plaintiffs in many circuits will face almost 
 
 67. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 955 (D. Nev. 2015), rev’d, 888 F.3d 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (collecting data breach cases post-Clapper and noting that most courts have held that 
“absent allegations of actual identity theft or other fraud, the increased risk of such harm alone is 
insufficient to satisfy Article III standing”); Dowty, supra note 22, at 688. 
 68. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing the district 
court’s dismissal because the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Article III standing based on the risk 
of identity theft); see also Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 389 (6th Cir. 
2016) (holding that data breach victims satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that data breach victims satisfied 
the injury-in-fact requirement because they faced a “credible threat of real and immediate 
harm”).  
 69. Dowty, supra note 22, at 689; see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“Appellants in this case have yet to suffer any harm, and their alleged increased risk of 
future injury is nothing more than speculation.”). 
 70. Dowty, supra note 22, at 689–90; see also Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 
2012) (finding that, because the plaintiff did “not identify any incident in which her data has ever 
been accessed by an unauthorized person,” her omission was “fatal” for satisfying Article III 
standing).  
 71. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267, 272–75 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs 
failed to show that the risks were substantial and the identity theft was not “certainly impending”). 
 72. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 
2017) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held 
that the fact that a person’s data was taken is enough by itself to create standing to sue . . . .”). But 
see Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ 
allegation of the threat of harm from a data breach was enough to satisfy the “injury in fact” 
standing requirement). 
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certain dismissal of their claims and find themselves unable to seek a 
legal remedy.  
Another unsuccessful approach has been for plaintiffs to argue 
that a breach devalues their personal information.73 The core of this 
“reduced value” theory is that personal information is inherently 
valuable and a breach “deprives the plaintiff[s] of that value.”74 While 
this theory has been accepted by some courts, especially in the Ninth 
Circuit,75 many other courts have rejected this theory.76 For example, 
plaintiff-customers brought a class action against Barnes & Noble after 
a security breach in which “skimmers” stole customer credit card and 
debit information.77 They claimed, among other things, that this breach 
resulted in a deprivation of the value of their PII.78 The court rejected 
this theory as insufficient to establish standing, instead finding that 
“[a]ctual injury of this sort is not established unless a plaintiff has the 
ability to sell his own information and a defendant sold the 
information.”79 Other courts have reached similar conclusions.80 
Plaintiffs have tried to pursue a third theory of standing: arguing 
that a portion of their payment to access a service was necessarily 
earmarked for data security through a contract, and because 
defendant’s data security was negligent, the plaintiffs were defrauded 
of that money.81 So, plaintiffs have alleged an “overpayment” equal to 
 
 73. See Boos et al., supra note 64, at 135–36 (observing the limited success of this approach 
in data breach cases).  
 74. Id. at 135. 
 75. See, e.g., In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 
2017 WL 3727318, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (noting that “the Data Breaches caused 
all Plaintiffs to suffer a loss of value of their PII as a result of the Data Breaches”); In re Anthem, 
Inc. Data Breach Litig. (“Anthem II”), No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. May 17, 2016) (finding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded damages); Claridge v. RockYou, 
Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the defendant’s control over the 
plaintiff’s PII was valuable property and therefore, the plaintiff should be responsible for the 
potential loss in value).  
 76. See Boos et al., supra note 64, at 136 n.38 (collecting cases dismissing the reduced value 
theory). 
 77. In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 3, 2013). 
 78. Id. at *5. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Yunker v. 
Pandora Media, Inc., 11–CV–03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Low 
v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 11-CV-01468-LHK, 2011 WL 5509848, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2011). 
 81. See Boos et al., supra note 64, at 141–42 (detailing the novelty and contours of the 
“overpayment” theory). 
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the premium paid to defendants for their alleged data security.82 
However, this “overpayment” theory has generally been rejected too.83 
Even if the plaintiffs overcome the standing hurdle, complications 
abound.84 For example, in In re iPhone Application Litigation,85 the 
Northern District of California found that mobile device 
manufacturers’ alleged violations of the Stored Communications Act 
and Apple’s further violations of the Wiretap Act—both based on 
unauthorized personal data collection and tracking—were sufficient to 
confer standing under the respective statutes.86 Nonetheless, the 
allegations were ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim under 
the statutes.87 Cases like In re Hulu Privacy Litigation88 also highlight 
potential class certification problems. Hulu customers claimed that 
their personal information was wrongly disclosed to third parties and 
successfully demonstrated this injury based on the Video Privacy 
Protection Act.89 Yet, the court denied class certification because the 
plaintiffs could not overcome the threshold issue of establishing and 
ascertaining a definable class.90 
So, federal courts have become a de facto roadblock for many 
litigants bringing data breach claims. The few success stories are 
overshadowed by the litany of courts unwilling to expand the reach of 
 
 82. Id. at 142.  
 83. See, e.g., In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 643 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J., concurring) (noting that the overpayment theory is “not sufficient to 
provide standing in the context of data thefts” and collecting cases where “courts have rejected” 
the theory); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding 
standing on other grounds, but declining “to push [overpayment] theory beyond its current 
scope”). But see Svenson v. Google Inc., No. 13-CV-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff had “alleged facts sufficient to show contract damages 
under a benefit of the bargain theory”).  
 84. For a brief overview of data breach litigation trends in 2017, see Client Release, Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Outlook and Review – 2018, at 25–
34 (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/us-cybersecurity-
and-data-privacy-outlook-and-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/64GT-5CNL]. 
 85. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 86. Id. at 1054–55.  
 87. Id. at 1056–62 (dismissing the Stored Communications Act and Wiretap Act arguments 
after the court narrowly interpreted the respective statutes to exclude the defendants and their 
electronic activities). 
 88. In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 2119193 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012). 
 89. Id. at *5, *8.  
 90. FED. R. CIV. P.  Rule 23(c)(1)(B) (“An order that certifies a class action must define the 
class and the class claims, issues, or defenses.”); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 
2014 WL 2758598, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014) (“Plaintiffs have offered no way to identify 
individual class members other than broad notice and a self-reporting affidavit.”). 
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consumers’ legal theories, thus preventing monetary recovery and 
hindering substantive changes in cybersecurity practices.   
2. Shareholder Lawsuits.  After a data breach, shareholders may 
file actions against companies for losses sustained post-breach through 
two methods: securities fraud class actions and derivative shareholder 
suits.91 However, recent developments in Delaware corporate law have 
created high barriers to prove these claims. Additionally, since many 
of these lawsuits are drawn-out endeavors driven primarily by 
plaintiffs’ counsel, any potential recovery is minimized. 
First, potential plaintiffs bring securities fraud class actions when 
disclosures of data breaches are followed by a noticeable drop in a 
company’s share price.92 These claims typically arise from Sections 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5,93 
and require plaintiffs to prove that the defendants “(1) made 
misstatements or omissions of material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (4) upon which 
plaintiffs relied; and (5) that plaintiffs’ reliance was the proximate 
cause of their injury.”94 
In data breach cases, shareholders typically allege that they relied 
on either a company’s pre-breach public disclosures, which 
understated data security risks or overstated cybersecurity protections, 
or the company withheld or was too slow in revealing the breach.95 
These fraud theories cover buyers who bought shares prior to a breach 
and those who sold in the period between the date of the breach and 
its disclosure.96 Since these disclosures typically decrease the share 
price, a shareholder’s potential recovery becomes the difference 
between the price paid by the buyer (or sold by the seller) and the 
market price after corrective disclosure.97 
 
 91. Kimberly R. Hillman & Collin J. Hite, Has the Fortress Been Hacked by Consumers? 
Cyber Class Actions Are Gaining Steam, ACC DOCKET, May 2016, at 62, 66. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 94. Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 95. Derek Borchardt & Craig A. Newman, The Next Big Thing: Data Breach Securities Class 
Action Litigation, PATTERSON BELKNAP: DATA SECURITY LAW BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.pbwt.com/data-security-law-blog/the-next-big-thing-data-breach-securities-class-
action-litigation [https://perma.cc/GF3D-A8WJ]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE CORPORATION § 9:32 (2017).  
MARCUS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:20 PM 
2018] DATA BREACH DILEMMA 571 
This litigation strategy has seen mixed results. For example, in 
2009, shareholders brought a securities fraud class action against 
Heartland Payment Systems after the company’s stock dropped by 80 
percent following the revelation of a data breach two years earlier in 
2007.98 The shareholders claimed that Heartland’s management made 
materially fraudulent statements by continuing to assert the adequacy 
of its data security on investor calls and through its 10-K filings after 
the earlier breach.99 The district court ultimately dismissed the 
complaint because Heartland emphasized a high level of security and 
promptly announced the breach to shareholders when it discovered its 
full impact.100 Similarly, when Yahoo’s stock price dropped in 2016 
after the company publicly disclosed massive data breaches from 2013 
and 2014, shareholders brought securities fraud lawsuits.101 While these 
claims were convincing enough to encourage Yahoo to settle for $80 
million,102 this disposition isn’t representative of a changing tide.103 As 
Heartland indicates, litigants bringing these securities fraud claims will 
continue facing the high burden of proving actual material 
misrepresentations or omissions related to companies’ security 
systems, and cannot rely on allegations of mere security inadequacies 
following a breach.104 
Second, shareholders may bring derivative actions for breach of 
fiduciary duties. As a basic principle, boards of directors and officers 
owe fiduciary duties to their corporations and stockholders.105 When 
making decisions, directors and officers are bound by the duties of care 
 
 98. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., CIV. No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148, at *1 
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009). 
 99. Hillman & Hite, supra note 91, at 66. 
 100. Id. (finding that the “mere fact of the security breach did not demonstrate that the 
company had failed to place appropriate emphasis on maintaining a high level of security”).  
 101. Kevin LaCroix, Yahoo Settles Data Breach-Related Securities Suit for $80 million, D&O 
DIARY (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litigation/yahoo-
settles-data-breach-related-securities-suit-80-million/ [https://perma.cc/3PLX-J8H6].  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (arguing that “merely because the Yahoo case, with all of these distinctive features, 
resulted in a significant settlement does not necessarily mean that many other companies will be 
sued or that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are going to be able to secure significant recoveries in a lot of 
other cases”). 
 104. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., CIV. No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148, at *7 
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009). 
 105. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees, 
[corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its 
stockholders.”). 
MARCUS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:20 PM 
572  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:555 
and loyalty.106 A corporate shareholder may bring a suit on behalf of 
the corporation to prove that the directors and officers breached a 
duty.107 However, before this action, the shareholders must make a 
demand on the board of directors to bring the suit on the corporation’s 
behalf, unless the shareholder can show such a demand would be 
“futile.”108 Courts take various approaches in evaluating demand 
futility,109 but generally allow suits to proceed if the shareholder can 
show that the directors were either “too self-interested or too 
controlled by the alleged wrongdoers to make a valid business 
decision” regarding whether to proceed with the suit.110  
In the context of data breaches, derivative claims are generally 
based on the “board’s failure to maintain adequate security to prevent 
the breach, failure to take adequate measures to respond and report 
the breach, or both.”111 However, claims that the board breached its 
fiduciary duty of care based on cybersecurity practices have generally 
been denied in the pleading stage because of the business judgment 
rule, which offers directors a presumption that they have upheld their 
 
 106. Lucie F. Huger & Danielle Durousseau, Director and Officer Liability for Data Breaches, 
30 WESTLAW J. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY, no. 24, 2016, at 1; see also William M. 
Lafferty, Lisa A. Schmidt & Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of 
Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 842–49 (2012) (explaining each of 
these duties and their origins in depth). The duty of care “requires that directors inform 
themselves ‘prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available 
to them.’” Id. at 842 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)). The duty of 
loyalty “requires a director to put the interests of the corporation and its stockholders ahead of 
the director’s own personal interests which are not shared by the stockholders generally.” Id. at 
845 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)). Related duties include 
good faith, confidentiality, and disclosure. Id. at 847–49.  
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; Carole F. Wilder, The Demand Requirement and the Business 
Judgment Rule: Synergistic Procedural Obstacles to Shareholder Derivative Suits, 5 PACE L. REV. 
633, 633 (1985). 
 108. Wilder, supra note 107, at 635. Courts have created a futility exception to the demand 
requirement, which allows plaintiff’s demand requirement to be excused when it would have been 
“futile,” “useless,” or “unavailing.” Id. at 636 (quoting Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 
228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955)).  
 109. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Circumstances Excusing Demand Upon Board of Directors 
that is Otherwise Prerequisite to Bringing of Stockholder’s Derivative Suit on Behalf of 
Corporation, 43 A.L.R.6th 1 (Originally published in 2009) (compiling federal and state court 
shareholder derivative suits and evaluating courts’ responses to whether shareholders’ demands 
were excused as futile).   
 110. Id.  
 111. Daniel S. Strick et al., Recent Developments Affecting Professionals’, Directors’, and 
Officers’ Liability, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 635, 648 (2016).  
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fiduciary duties.112 For example, courts have generally supported 
corporate boards that refuse to indulge shareholders’ post-data breach 
derivative suits, so long as the board conferred with outside counsel 
and took steps to improve security after the breach.113  
Litigants who bring suits against boards for breach of loyalty 
claims, such as failing to institute internal controls to prevent data 
breaches, have faced similar challenges because of the legal distinction 
between poor business judgment and bad faith in Delaware law. In a 
recent breach of loyalty suit against Home Depot following a data 
breach,114 the plaintiffs failed to make a demand to the board, believing 
it to be futile.115 In response, the Northern District of Georgia, applying 
Delaware law, noted that the plaintiffs were required to show “director 
conduct that [was] ‘so egregious on its face that board approval [could 
not] meet the test of business judgment, and a substantial likelihood of 
director liability therefore exist[ed].’”116 Combining the demand futility 
standard and the breach of loyalty claim meant the plaintiffs had to 
overcome a heavy burden and plead with particularized facts “that a 
majority of the [Home Depot] Board faced substantial liability,” and 
therefore was not disinterested in the corporation’s potential suit 
against the board “because it consciously failed to act in the face of a 
known duty to act.”117 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs failed to do so. 
Because the directors were only required to take “any course of action 
that was reasonable,” the plaintiffs could not make a claim that the 
directors breached the duty of loyalty.118 Here, that action was the 
 
 112. See id. at 644–45 (“The business judgment rule is a common law doctrine protecting 
directors and officers from liability when they make good faith business decisions in an informed 
and deliberate manner.”).  
 113. See, e.g., Palkon v. Holmes, No. 2:14-CV-01234 SRC, 2014 WL 5341880, at *1, *6 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 20, 2014) (finding that the board’s refusal of the shareholder’s demand was not based on bad 
faith or an unreasonable investigation and dismissing the case because of the business judgment 
rule’s “strong presumption” in favor of not questioning the business decisions of boards); see also 
Brian J. Perreault, Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits Spawning from Cyber Attacks, 1 DATA SEC. 
& PRIVACY L. § 8:55 (2018) (discussing a derivative action against the retailer Target and eventual 
dismissal of the lawsuit because Target’s outside Special Litigation Committee—which the court 
determined was disinterested and demonstrated good faith in its investigation—recommended 
not pursuing the derivative claim).   
 114. In re The Home Depot, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1320–21 
(N.D. Ga. 2016). 
 115. Id. at 1324. 
 116. Id. at 1325 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)). 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 1326. 
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Board’s pre-breach plan to fix Home Depot’s security weaknesses.119 
The court concluded that while the Board’s implementation of this 
plan may have been slow and imperfect, unwise business judgments are 
not enough to plead bad faith, and thus the demand was not excused 
as to the breach of loyalty claims.120 While an appeal was filed, the 
parties ultimately settled on April 28, 2017.121  
Consequently, if directors and officers maintain some 
cybersecurity mechanisms, the company will likely be shielded from 
any liability. Unless there is a push for an increased cybersecurity 
fiduciary duty, Delaware law will remain a dead-letter for motivating 
companies to alter their cybersecurity practices. Additionally, 
shareholder derivative suits and securities fraud class actions appear 
driven by plaintiffs’ counsel and their own profit motivations,122 
increasing the likelihood of settlement. Although some settlements 
may result in corporate governance reforms,123 parties do not prioritize 
the protection of consumers’ personal information. Therefore, they are 
unlikely to encourage significant changes in this field. 
 
 119. Id. at 1327. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Kevin LaCroix, Home Depot Settles Data Breach-Related Derivative Lawsuit, D&O 
DIARY (May 1, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/05/articles/cyber-liability/home-depot-
settles-data-breach-related-derivative-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/REM7-TMZP]. In a sign of the 
continued usage of these actions, shareholders of the Wendy’s fast food restaurant recently filed 
their own derivative lawsuit with the intention of using the previous cases as a template to 
overcome the high hurdles they face in the demand stage. See Joseph B. Crace, Jr. & Virginia M. 
Yetter, When Does Data Breach Liability Extend to the Boardroom?, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 2017, 12:43 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/907786 [https://perma.cc/RMB9-YCBT] (observing that 
the substantive allegations in the Wendy’s suit are nearly identical to those in previous suits, but 
that the plaintiffs have provided more detailed allegations regarding demand futility). 
 122. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 
GA. L. REV. 745, 750 (2000) (finding that because plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to damages, 
representative litigation does not create a substantial incentive for plaintiffs to litigate, but does 
incentivize the plaintiff’s bar); see also LaCroix, supra note 121 (arguing that the plaintiff’s bar is 
“very entrepreneurial” and is continuously testing the legal waters of these data breach cases).  
 123. Home Depot agreed to adopt cybersecurity corporate governance reforms and to pay up 
to $1.125 million in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. LaCroix, supra note 121. It also agreed to document 
the duties and responsibilities of the Chief Information Security Officer and maintain an 
executive-level committee focused on data security. Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for 
Preliminary Approval of Shareholder Derivative Settlement and Memorandum of Law in 
Support at 2, In re The Home Depot, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 1:15-CV-2999 TWT, 
2017 WL 1830045, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2017).  
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B. Limited Public Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms  
The current public regulatory framework is a patchwork of federal 
and state laws. As a national security issue, the U.S. government is 
working to prevent large-scale data breaches. This has become a 
coordinated effort between multiple agencies, such as the Department 
of Homeland Security,124 the Department of Justice,125 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.126 However, there is no 
comprehensive federal data security legislation.127 Instead, a series of 
overlapping state laws exist that regulate similar conduct (such as 
notification requirements for data breaches), but with state-specific 
variations (such as the timing or method of notice).128 Additionally, the 
FTC seeks to protect consumers’ information in the private sector 
through civil enforcement actions and policy initiatives.129  
While many of these efforts are steps in the right direction for 
setting minimum cybersecurity standards, most remain reactive 
measures. First, two of the most robust federal laws protecting 
consumers’ information are confined to the financial and healthcare 
sectors.130 In the financial sector, GLBA contains provisions for 
cybersecurity liability for banks, securities firms, insurance companies, 
and other tangential companies.131 Under GLBA, government 
 
 124. Combating Cyber Crime, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/combating-cyber-crime# [https://perma.cc/ND9J-B5ZF] (“The 
Department of Homeland Security . . . conduct[s] high-impact criminal investigations to disrupt 
and defeat cyber criminals, prioritize the recruitment and training of technical experts, develop 
standardized methods, and broadly share cyber response best practices and tools.”).  
 125. See Caldwell, supra note 36 (“[I]t is no surprise that the Attorney General has made clear 
that fighting cybercrime is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Justice.”). 
 126. Cybersecurity, the SEC and You, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMM’N (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/BRM6-GC9B] (“The SEC uses its 
civil law authority to bring cybersecurity-related enforcement actions that protect investors, hold 
bad actors accountable and deter future wrongdoing.”).  
 127. Greene et al., supra note 62, at 94.  
 128. See Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 30 (listing security breach notification 
laws for each state).  
 129. Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N: 
BUS. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2016, 2:34 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc [https://perma.cc/6FJ4-8KWL] (“The FTC has 
undertaken substantial efforts for well over a decade to promote data security in the private sector 
through civil law enforcement, business outreach and consumer education, policy initiatives, and 
recommendations to Congress to enact legislation in this area.”). 
 130. While there are similar personal information and consumer protection statutes, such as 
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012), and the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012), this Note will focus on GLBA and HIPAA. 
 131. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act §§ 501–510, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012).  
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agencies and authorities must “establish appropriate standards” for 
financial institutions to safeguard customers’ personal financial 
information in order to: (1) “[e]nsure the security and confidentiality 
of customer records and information,” (2) “protect against any 
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
records,” and (3) “protect against unauthorized access to or use of such 
records or information which could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.”132 In the health care sphere, HIPAA 
protects consumers’ private medical information133 when it is used by 
health care providers, data processors, pharmacies, and other 
companies with the need to access to medical information.134 Violations 
of these privacy provisions may result in either civil or criminal 
liability.135 HIPAA also has specific provisions for breach notification 
that allow the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to bring 
civil actions for violations.136  
In recent years, legislators have proposed several national data 
security provisions with little success. Connecticut Senator Richard 
Blumenthal introduced one of the most consumer-friendly bills, the 
Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014.137 
This bill set data security standards for businesses collecting and using 
sensitive PII.138 It also proposed civil and criminal penalties for 
companies failing to protect this information and notify consumers in 
a timely manner following a breach.139 Similarly, Vermont Senator 
Patrick Leahy has sought passage of the Personal Data Privacy and 
 
 132. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 3B Fed. Proc. Forms § 8:394 (2018). 
 133. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (establishing 
HIPAA regulations).  
 134. Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. 
L. (July 1, 2016), http://us.practicallaw.com/6-502-0467.  
 135. EDWARD F. MALONE, JENNER & BLOCK, LLC, “WHO GOES TO JAIL?” A GUIDE FOR 
HIPAA PRIVACY OFFICERS 1 (2002), http://www.ehcca.com/presentations/HIPAA3/ 
malone_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB39-EQ33]. 
 136. HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–414 (2016). 
 137. Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995, 113th Cong. 
(2014). 
 138. Id. § 202 (requiring business entities to implement a comprehensive program that: “(1) 
ensure[s] the privacy, security, and confidentiality of sensitive personally identifiable information; 
(2) protect[s] against any anticipated vulnerabilities to the privacy, security, or integrity of [such 
information]; and (3) protect[s] against unauthorized access to or use of [such information] that 
could create a significant risk of harm to any individual”). 
 139. Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt To Pass Data Security 
and Breach Notification Legislation, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 437, 452 (2015). 
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Security Act140 since 2005.141 This bill would enact a federal security 
breach notification law and set standards for data and security 
programs.142 However, these bills, and other similar pieces of 
legislation, have been met by continued resistance within Congress 
because of the divergent interests of businesses, state legislatures, and 
consumer advocacy groups.143  
Second, the state-level laws on data security and breach 
notification that have been enacted and enforced by state attorneys 
general vary in substance and scope. Breach notification laws have 
been passed in fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.144 Each state retains differences in these 
provisions, such as which companies must comply, definitions of 
“personal information,” what constitutes a breach, and the 
requirements for notifying those affected by the breach.145  
Currently, California has some of the most robust data security 
laws in the country. California’s present privacy law applies to all 
persons, businesses, and state agencies in California that own or license 
personal information.146 This is a broader definition than some states’ 
laws that cover or exempt only certain types of companies.147 In 
California, companies are required to publicize any breach of their 
security systems to all residents whose unencrypted personal 
 
 140. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 141. Newman, supra note 139, at 449 (citing Eric Chabrow, Why U.S. Breach Notice Bill Won’t 
Pass, BANK INFO. SEC. (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/us-breach-notice-
bill-wont-pass-p-1602/op-1 [https://perma.cc/GSA7-5V2K]).  
 142. See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897, 113th Cong. (2014) (stating 
that the bill’s purpose is “[t]o prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide 
notice of security breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and 
other protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally 
identifiable information”). 
 143. See Joshua R. Eckert, Passing Federal Security Breach Legislation: A “How-to Guide,” 
10 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 27, 47 (2015) (noting that businesses have rejected these laws for imposing 
burdens “above and beyond those that are implemented by most states,” while state legislatures 
and consumer groups have been wary of federal legislation “that is not at least as protective of 
their citizens as their current state statutory scheme”). 
 144. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2017). 
 147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171 (2014) (covering commercial entities that maintain PII, 
but not individuals); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(a) (2010) (covering information brokers or data 
collectors that have personal information of individuals); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(3) 
(2005) (covering information brokers that engage, “in whole or in part in the business of 
collecting . . . information concerning individuals for the primary purpose of furnishing personal 
information to nonaffiliated 3rd parties”) (emphasis added).  
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information has been acquired by an unauthorized person.148 Like 
many similar data laws, these only apply to California residents, and 
may not trigger any notification requirements for other similarly 
affected consumers.149 However, in 2018 the California legislature 
passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (A.B. 375).150 The new 
Act broadly defines personal information151 and gives California 
consumers a multitude of privacy rights, including the right to know 
what personal information is being collected about them, the right to 
know whether that information is being sold or disclosed and to whom, 
and the right to opt out of the sale of that information.152 Since the Act 
won’t go into effect until January 2020, companies that collect personal 
information have time to analyze the law’s implications and potentially 
propose limiting or clarifying amendments.153   
Outside of California, most state laws remain reactionary because 
they have requirements for data breach notifications, but not 
regulations for information security protections.154 While not as 
innovative as California, two states—Massachusetts and New York—
are moving towards greater protection of personal information. 
Massachusetts’ 2010 data security regulation applies to “[e]very person 
that owns or licenses personal information about a resident of the 
Commonwealth” and requires increased data security, such as 
instituting comprehensive information security programs, ensuring 
adequate security training for employees, and encrypting personal 
data.155 While no private right of action exists for consumers, the 
Massachusetts state attorney general may bring claims against 
companies that violate this section.156 In New York, the State 
 
 148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82. 
 149. Id. § 1798.82(a) (“A person or business that conducts business in California . . . shall 
disclose a breach of the security of the system . . . to a resident of California . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  
 150. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Stat. 91 (codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE TIT. 1.81.5 (2018)) (effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
 151. CAL. CIV. CODE  § 1798.140(o) (listing “personal information” as a consumer’s personal 
identifiers, commercial information, biometric information, geolocation data, etc.).  
 152. Id. §§ 1798.100—120.   
 153. Dipayan Ghosh, What You Need To Know About California’s New Data Privacy Law, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/what-you-need-to-know-about-
californias-new-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/L9VG-HP92]. 
 154. See Jolly, supra note 134 (noting that early state breach notification laws tended to be 
“reactive” solutions). 
 155. 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.03 (2009). 
 156. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 6 (2018).  
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Department of Financial Services recently enacted the Cybersecurity 
Requirements for Financial Services Companies regulation for 
increased cybersecurity compliance in the financial sector.157 
Specifically, the regulation is “designed to promote the protection of 
customer information as well as the information technology systems of 
regulated entities.”158 The law requires covered entities to maintain a 
Chief Information Security Officer for overseeing and implementing 
cybersecurity programs.159 It also requires the Board of Directors or a 
Senior Officer to sign off on these changes for compliance.160 Notably, 
the New York regulation contains a private right of action, while the 
Massachusetts one does not. At bottom, both the New York and 
Massachusetts regulations are imperfect, but they nonetheless 
represent the progression toward stricter data security measures 
beyond California. 
Third, while the FTC has become the de facto regulatory agency 
for cybersecurity enforcement, the agency has been relatively 
conservative in its approach.161 This restraint may stem from the 
original uncertainty surrounding the FTC’s power in the cybersecurity 
realm.162 Recently, the FTC’s ability to enforce cybersecurity claims 
was reaffirmed.163  Section 5(a) of the FTC Act gives the FTC the ability 
to investigate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”164 For example, it 
is a  “deceptive” practice if a company promises to securely maintain 
data and then experiences a breach resulting from inadequate 
standards.165 An “unfair” practice would be if a company failed to 
adopt “industry-standard security measures.”166 This may include 
failures to maintain adequate log-in protocols, create data encryption 
procedures, or conduct cybersecurity training.167  
 
 157. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, pt. 500 (2018). 
 158. Id. § 500.00.  
 159. Id. § 500.04.  
 160. Id. § 500 App’x A. 
 161. See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 31, at 2266 (arguing that the FTC has “developed its 
jurisprudence in a measured and modest way” and should strive for more proactive enforcement).  
 162. Id. at 2236–37.  
 163. See id. at 2240 (arguing that FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247–48 
(3d Cir. 2015), upheld the FTC’s power to regulate corporate cybersecurity through Section 5(a) 
of the FTC Act). 
 164. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 165. Greene et al., supra note 62, at 94.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
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One notable victory for the FTC was against LifeLock, an identity 
theft protection agency, in 2015.168 According to the FTC’s filing, 
LifeLock violated a 2010 federal court order requiring the company to 
secure consumers’ information and prohibiting deceptive 
advertising.169 LifeLock failed to establish a comprehensive 
information security program and falsely advertised that it protected 
its consumers’ personal information “with the same high-level 
safeguards used by financial institutions.”170 LifeLock was required to 
pay $100 million to consumers in settlement fees.171 However, the 
FTC’s reach has been limited to only the most egregious cases, such as 
LifeLock and the breach of the dating website Ashley Madison.172 
Some critics contend that the FTC is engaging in “a form of rulemaking 
. . . where it lacks meaningful rulemaking authority” by regulating 
cybersecurity practices.173 But proponents of the FTC consider its de 
facto rulemaking an inevitable result of the agency’s ability to enforce 
broad reasonableness standards and have proposed expanding its 
role.174 Thus, the FTC’s function remains a source of debate and 
exemplifies the uncertainty surrounding enforcement in the 
cybersecurity realm.  
III.  PROACTIVE SOLUTIONS FOR PROTECTING CONSUMERS 
Given the inevitable rise of data breaches, consumer information 
will remain vulnerable unless drastic changes are made to influence 
how companies collect and store data. Private litigation has provided 
little incentive for companies to make these necessary changes.175 
Instead, a robust national data security law must be adopted to prevent 
consumer information from being exposed by data breaches. First, this 
should be modeled on current federal privacy laws like HIPAA or 
 
 168. LifeLock to Pay $100 Million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges It Violated 2010 Order, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/ 
lifelock-pay-100-million-consumers-settle-ftc-charges-it-violated [https://perma.cc/BD2C-9RLQ]. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  
 172. See Operators of AshleyMadison.com Settle FTC, State Charges Resulting from 2015 Data 
Breach that Exposed 36 Million Users’ Profile Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/operators-ashleymadisoncom-settle-ftc-
state-charges-resulting [https://perma.cc/7NUL-EXHJ] (announcing the FTC’s settlement with 
Ashley Madison for deceiving customers and releasing 36 million users’ accounts).   
 173. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 31, at 2232.  
 174. Id. at 2259–63. 
 175. See supra Part II.A. 
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GLBA, as well as state data protection legislation. Ideally, this new law 
would extend to all companies using consumers’ personal information 
and would create minimum-security requirements for collecting and 
storing this information. Additionally, it should expand the jurisdiction 
of the FTC as the primary enforcement agency for data breach claims. 
Second, since even companies with strong security practices will 
inevitably face cyber threats, similarly proactive solutions must be 
implemented on the front-end to minimize the exposure of personal 
information. Regulating the use of SSNs or creating a decentralized 
identification system, for example based on blockchain technology, are 
potential solutions for protecting this information.   
A. Implementing a National Data Security Law  
A national data security law is a necessary preventive measure for 
data protection for three reasons. First, legislation would be more 
efficient than relying primarily on private litigation to encourage 
cybersecurity reforms on a company-by-company basis. Second, a 
federal law would create uniform standards for companies’ data 
collection, storage, and usage, instead of depending on a patchwork of 
state laws. Third, from an enforcement perspective, increasing the 
power of the FTC would encourage necessary compliance with the new 
law. 
First, the challenges associated with private litigation make it an 
inefficient route for protecting consumers. While plaintiffs have 
continued to propose novel claims following data breaches, the legal 
landscape has failed to move in tandem with technological advances.176 
Litigants are forced to work within existing legal structures ill-suited 
for responding to data breaches and the unique injuries that follow.177  
Some argue that new data statutes should create a private right of 
action.178 This would make it easier to support a claim of injury after 
data breaches. While the constitutionality of this solution would be at 
 
 176. See Dowty supra note 22, at 687 (“In the realm of data breaches, technology is 
progressing rapidly; consequently, there is a lag time between the progress of technology and 
progress of the law.”); see also supra note 84 (detailing data breach litigation trends in 2017 and 
the procedural status of various cases, such as Yahoo).  
 177. See supra Part III.A. 
 178. See, e.g., Bradyn Fairclough, Privacy Piracy: The Shortcomings of the United States’ Data 
Privacy Regime and How To Fix It, 42 J. CORP. L. 461, 472 (2016) (arguing that a private right of 
action would facilitate plaintiffs’ ability to show concrete harm without accompanying damages).  
MARCUS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  5:20 PM 
582  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:555 
issue,179 even a successful statutory private right of action would be a 
reactionary solution. Besides the potential costs of litigation and bad 
press, companies unaffected by data breaches have little incentive to 
alter their data collection, usage, and storage procedures. Many boards 
of directors and executives may realize the potential threat of 
cyberthreats in theory but overlook this possibility within their own 
companies. Legislation is needed to encourage changes in the security 
context. Otherwise, these perceived risks will continue to be 
discounted. Data security has become such a pressing issue that we can 
no longer trust boards to make decisions surrounding consumer data 
without a new legislative oversight framework.  
Second, a national law would provide a uniform, and potentially 
more robust, solution than the existing collection of state laws. 
Currently, most state laws require companies to notify customers after 
their personal information has been stolen.180 However, many of these 
state laws fail to set demanding cybersecurity standards and limit the 
definition of what constitutes personal information.181 In contrast, 
setting a high bar for data security through a national law would be 
extremely advantageous from an efficiency perspective by providing a 
unified standard. Companies whose operations typically transcend 
state and even national boundaries, would not need to navigate 
multiple states’ divergent security and breach notification laws.  
Critics of national data laws may point to the interaction between 
federal and state environmental policy, arguing that statutes like 
California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 will be effective 
mechanisms for privacy protection across the entire country. However, 
it remains to be seen whether this Act will have its intended effect, 
because other states may create their own competing data privacy laws 
or legislate ways to allow companies to avoid the Act’s requirements 
in their state. While it may be more cost-effective for car manufacturers 
to set uniform motor vehicle air emissions standards based on stringent 
California laws, technology allows companies the flexibility to be more 
 
 179. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (finding that plaintiffs failed 
to establish Article III standing although the Endangered Species Act created a right of action). 
But see Patrick J. Lorio, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, and A 
Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 116 (2017) (arguing that a “data 
breach statute . . . need only give the right to sue to those specific individuals whose personal 
information is exposed” to circumvent concerns stemming from Lujan).  
 180. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (examining the divergent requirements 
and breadth of states’ existing data security and breach laws). 
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discerning about whose information they collect. For example, 
company X based in New York may have no trouble filtering out which 
of their customers are from California and which are from other states. 
So, even if states like California still opted for even more robust 
standards, a national law would set a baseline for company X’s use of 
the average customer’s data, while allowing the company to be more 
restrictive with the California customer’s data. Such a bifurcated 
system is not inconceivable because companies already collect as much 
information as possible on consumers, and have little incentive to stop 
unless nudged by increased regulation.    
This proposal has precedent, as national laws for protecting 
medical and financial information—HIPAA and GLBA—already 
exist. A new nationwide data law could be built using these existing 
frameworks. As in Massachusetts, broadening the definition of 
“personal information” should expand the universe of companies 
subjected to the new law.182 Similarly, on the technical side, this law 
should create minimum cybersecurity standards for data storage, 
require encryption of all forms of PII, and mandate adequate security 
training for all companies. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
National Institute of Standards and Technology has already proposed 
technical guidelines for federal agencies using digital identification 
mechanisms.183 Similar guidelines should be used to set industry 
standards based on companies’ size and existing technological 
infrastructure. Additionally, as in New York, a new law should require 
companies of certain sizes to add a Chief Information Security Officer 
position and ensure they sign off on cybersecurity compliance.184 From 
the rights perspective, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
provides an excellent starting point for giving consumers access to their 
information.185 However, more can be accomplished, including 
requiring companies to gain opt-in consent prior to collecting this 
data.186  
 
 182. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (applying the state’s security regulation to 
“[e]very person that owns or licenses personal information about a resident of the 
Commonwealth”).  
 183. PAUL A. GRASSI, MICHAEL E. GARCIA & JAMES L. FENTON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, NIST SP 800-63-3, DIGITAL IDENTITY GUIDELINES (2017).  
 184. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.  
 185. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.  
 186. Adam Schwartz, Lee Tien & Corynne McSherry, How to Improve the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Aug. 8,  
2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/how-improve-california-consumer-privacy-act-2018 
[https://perma.cc/X26V-R6XG]. 
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Additionally, while efforts to enact national data security laws 
have failed in the past, after large-scale scandals, like Equifax or 
Facebook, increased public conversations may lead to new regulatory 
actions.187 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in the wake of 
numerous corporate accounting scandals between 2000 and 2002, like 
Enron and Arthur Andersen.188 And lawmakers in Congress are 
already pushing for increased cybersecurity regulations.189 One 
example, the Personal Data Notification and Protection Act, would 
require companies to disclose breaches within thirty days to the FTC 
and Department of Homeland Security.190 Another is the Data Broker 
Accountability and Transparency Act, which would allow the public to 
opt-out of having personal data collected and sold by brokers.191 The 
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which went into 
effect in May 2018, exemplifies what a far-reaching privacy law looks 
like.192  The GDPR adopts standards for utilizing EU citizens’ data, 
including requiring explicit consent for using consumers’ information 
and allowing consumers to access copies of their data or delete it 
completely.193 At first glance, implementing these regulations may 
 
 187. Jeff John Roberts, Why Equifax Executives Will Get Away with the Worst Data Breach 
in History, FORTUNE (Sept. 16, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/16/equifax-legal/ 
[https://perma.cc/9JW4-Z88U] (citing Duke University School of Law Professor Sam Buell’s 
argument that Equifax may trigger new regulatory oversight).   
 188. Rosemary Peavler, The Enron Scandal that Prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, BALANCE 
(July 16, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/sarbanes-oxley-act-and-the-enron-scandal-393497 
[https://perma.cc/YB8J-RS7V].  
 189. Christopher Mims, After Equifax, Should the Government Force Companies To Report 
Hacks?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-the-u-s-
require-companies-to-report-breaches-1506254402 [https://perma.cc/G7UX-AVUK].  
 190. Id.  
 191. Joe Uchill, Dems Propose Data Security Bill After Equifax Hack, HILL (Sept. 4,  
2017, 1:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/350694-on-heels-of-equifax-breach-dems-
propose-data-broker-privacy-and-security [https://perma.cc/4SAZ-V6WE].  
 192. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data and Repealing Council Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. For a 
full background on the GDPR, as well a user-friendly FAQ, see 2018 Reform of EU Data 
Protection Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-
rules_en [https://perma.cc/3CKV-V8KV]. 
 193. See Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Why a Privacy Law Like GDPR  
Would Be a Tough Sell in the U.S., WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/05/25/the-
cybersecurity-202-why-a-privacy-law-like-gdpr-would-be-a-tough-sell-in-the-u-s/ 
5b07038b1b326b492dd07e83/?utm_term=.806cce7e6167 [https://perma.cc/BPX8-VVX6] 
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appear improbable in the U.S., but the “public appetite for data privacy 
regulation” is only increasing.194  
Third, since there is already widespread discussion of the FTC in 
the data breach context,195 a new data security law should clarify and 
expand the agency’s role. Increasing the FTC’s power will provide a 
viable enforcement mechanism for encouraging compliance with any 
new national standards. The FTC should be able to impose heightened 
civil penalties on companies failing to implement reasonable 
protections in accordance with these regulations.196 Additionally, since 
the FTC is required to provide fair notice to the entities it regulates,197 
creating a national data security law would help tie this notice to a 
uniform industry standard. Giving the FTC explicit rulemaking 
authority would also allow it to “develop more systematic rules where 
they are needed.”198 At bottom, companies would be more likely to 
comply with new federal legislation if the role of enforcement agencies 
like the FTC was clearly defined and tougher penalties could be levied 
for violations.  
A new data security law may finally begin to take shape in the next 
few years because of the rapid increase in data breaches and the 
heightened publicity surrounding their aftermath.199 Lobbyists for data 
brokers, as well as political hurdles in Congress—obstacles arising in 
 
(examining the differences between the U.S. and the EU’s privacy regimes in the wake of the 
GDPR legislation). 
 194. Id.  
 195. E.g., Hartzog & Solove, supra note 31; Arias, supra note 129; see also Corey L. Andrews, 
Federal Court’s Embrace of FTC Data-Breach Settlements as ‘Common Law’ Treads on Due 
Process, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/12/19/ federal-
courts-embrace-of-ftc-data-breach-settlements-as-common-law-treads-on-due-process/ 
#244ed50e24d1 [https://perma.cc/Q9PH-C6W3] (arguing against the FTC’s recent use of 
“enforcement actions (and the resulting consent decrees) as a source of ‘common law’ that places 
the business community on sufficient notice of what data-security practices § 5 of the FTC Act 
requires”). 
 196. Cf. Arias, supra note 129 (noting that “since 2001, the FTC has settled some 60 cases 
against companies the FTC alleges failed to provide reasonable protections for consumers’ 
personal information”).  
 197. Hartzog & Solove, supra note 31, at 2291.  
 198. Id. at 2299.  
 199. In November 2017, Senators Bill Nelson, Richard Blumenthal, and Tammy  
Baldwin introduced a federal data breach notification bill that would require companies to  
report data breaches within 30 days or face criminal consequences. Selena Larson, Senators  
Introduce Data Breach Disclosure Bill, CNN TECH (Dec. 1, 2017, 10:51 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/technology/bill-data-breach-laws/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/9QR8-B6MK]. While it is a strong start, the bill does not go far enough to set mandatory 
cybersecurity standards for protecting consumers’ information pre-data breach.  
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tandem with any large-scale legislation—may delay this process. 
Nevertheless, because of the increasing privacy concerns, data security 
and breaches are trending from niche topics into regularly-debated 
bipartisan issues.200  
B. Social Security Numbers and Blockchain Technology  
While federal legislation is necessary for setting uniform security 
standards, this alone is unlikely to prevent companies from continuing 
to collect and sell consumers’ personal and financial information. 
Proactive solutions must also address the inputs in this equation by 
going to the source—individuals and companies’ universal reliance on 
outdated forms of PII. One viable option is to incorporate a provision 
in this proposed national data security law that curtails companies’ 
liberal use of Social Security numbers. A second, more long-term goal 
is to create an alternative identification system altogether; for example, 
a decentralized identification system based on distributed ledger 
technology like blockchain. 
1. Regulation of Social Security Numbers.  New regulations in 
federal law should incorporate provisions to limit companies’ use of 
Social Security numbers in the private sector. SSNs were not intended 
to be personal identifiers.201 Without federal regulations, banks, 
hospitals, government agencies and companies alike have turned SSNs 
into an easy method of identifying and authenticating people and their 
information.202 However, once these identifiers are compromised in a 
data breach, they are almost impossible to change, unlike a standard 
password.203  
One solution is for Congress to explicitly prohibit companies from 
using SSNs as passwords and personal identifiers.204 This would require 
the private sector to develop alternate means of identifying consumers. 
For example, companies could assign each customer a company-
specific ID. If a healthcare company was breached and exposed its 
customer data, but didn’t possess SSNs, it would be harder for identity 
 
 200. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 201. Puckett, supra note 44, at 67. 
 202. Daniel Castro, Time to Retire Social Security Numbers, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Sept. 16, 2017), 
http://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2017/09/16/time_to_retire_social_security_numbers_110
358.html [https://perma.cc/AGA2-ZXFE]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.; see Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 55, at 54 (arguing for a federal law prohibiting 
the use of SSNs as passwords).  
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thieves to link this information to customers’ accounts at different 
companies. This reduces the potential of hackers exploiting SSNs as a 
“key.” Although potentially ameliorating security concerns, this 
prohibition also shifts the burden to individuals. It requires consumers 
to maintain and protect their own company-specific IDs. Thus, any 
prohibition on SSNs must result from a weighing of the security 
improvement with the added inefficiencies that result from using 
multiple identifiers.  
Instead, the government should begin phasing out the Social 
Security number altogether. In 2007, the Office of Management and 
Budget issued a memo requiring federal departments and agencies to 
begin eliminating the unnecessary use of SSNs.205 The House Ways and 
Means Committee is exploring this option and has discussed having 
agencies, such as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
eliminate the use of beneficiaries’ SSNs as a primary identifier on their 
Medicare cards.206 Individual states, like California, have been at the 
forefront of these changes by limiting the printing of SSNs on IDs and 
certain membership cards.207  
If the U.S. government eliminates its own reliance on Social 
Security numbers, private companies are likely to follow suit. SSNs are 
widely distributed across companies in part because consumers have 
been conditioned to readily hand over these numbers.208 If the federal 
government and states started phasing out their usage, it would change 
how individuals view their SSNs. Alternatively, if the number was 
solely used for Social Security benefits, there would be no reason to 
collect SSNs outside of the employment context. Individuals would be 
warier of habitually providing this information since companies would 
have no specific use for the number. 
 
 205. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. NO. 07-
16, SAFEGUARDING AGAINST AND RESPONDING TO THE BREACH OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 7 (2007). 
 206. Federal Agencies Have “A Long Way to Go” to Limit the Use of Social Security Numbers 
and Adequately Protect Americans’ Identities, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE 
WAYS & MEANS: BLOG (May 23, 2017), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/federal-agencies-long-
way-go-limit-use-social-security-numbers-adequately-protect-americans-identities/ [https:// 
perma.cc/TYJ8-C2B6].  
 207. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, SECURITY IN NUMBERS: SSNS AND ID THEFT 8 (2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/security-numbers-social-security-
numbers-and-identity-theft-federal-trade-commission-report/p075414ssnreport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8KDT-G7KZ]. 
 208. Cf. supra note 52 and accompanying text (listing the many businesses that obtain 
consumers’ SSNs). 
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Companies that persistently request Social Security numbers 
could even be at a financial disadvantage. If this information was stolen 
in a data breach, hackers may have a better chance of successfully 
conducting identity theft. This would result in increased litigation 
against companies by victims of data breach and identity theft. 
Accordingly, minimizing the ubiquity of SSNs in daily life may create 
a disincentive for companies to collect this personal information in the 
first place.  
2. Blockchain-Based Personal Identification Systems.  In the long-
term, legislators should explore alternative identification systems and 
methods for storing personal information that would make Social 
Security numbers obsolete. Biometric identification systems have been 
proposed,209 but must confront significant technological210 and legal 
challenges.211 A new national ID card is another possibility, but faces 
similar concerns.212 Though still a fledgling technology, blockchain 
appears to be one of the most promising options because of its unique 
security properties. 
At its simplest, blockchain is an example of a distributed ledger 
system.213 This system is like a “giant, global spreadsheet that runs on 
millions and millions of computers. It’s distributed. It’s open source, 
meaning that anyone can view and change the underlying code. It’s 
 
 209. “Biometrics is ‘[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of 
individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.’” Margaret Hu, Biometric ID 
Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1477 n.3 (2013) (quoting JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC 
TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007)). Biometric data includes individuals’ 
digital photos, fingerprints and iris scans, and DNA. Id. at 1478. The theory is that this information 
is unique to every person and would be much harder than Social Security numbers to easily 
duplicate. Id. at 1477–78.  
 210. See, e.g., Aditi Roy, Nasir Memon & Arun Ross, MasterPrint: Exploring the Vulnerability 
of Partial Fingerprint-Based Authentication Systems, 12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. 
FORENSICS & SEC. 2013, 2013 (2017) (arguing that certain fingerprint-based authentication 
systems, like on smartphones, may be vulnerable to impersonations).  
 211. The main apprehensions stem from Fourth Amendment privacy concerns over the 
government’s control of individuals’ personal information and the potential for misuse through 
increased cybersurveillance. See Hu, supra note 209, at 1481–82 (arguing that “it is necessary to 
consider what role, if any, the Fourth Amendment will play in restraining a rapidly evolving 
bureaucratized cybersurveillance movement”). 
 212. See 5 Problems with National ID Cards, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/5-problems-
national-id-cards [https://perma.cc/w7F5-788M] (highlighting how national ID cards create vexing 
technical challenges and menacing legal problems). 
 213. See Nolan Bauerle, What is a Distributed Ledger?, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-a-distributed-ledger/ [https://perma.cc/X2SB-
RQG6] (“In its simplest form, a distributed ledger is a database held and updated independently 
by each participant (or node) in a large network.”). 
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truly peer to peer; it doesn’t require powerful intermediaries to 
authenticate or to settle transactions.”214 For example, the Bitcoin 
blockchain anonymously keeps track of financial transactions between 
individuals using Bitcoin currency.215 Instead of financial transactions, 
a blockchain system could record any structured information from land 
ownership to marriage records.216 Blockchain is open-source and 
public, but the information it records can be encrypted.217 So, someone 
may be able to view the entire encrypted database without being able 
to read its contents.218  
In the public sector, encrypted distributed ledgers have a number 
of uses. Such ledgers could be used to keep “certified copies of identity 
documents, biometric test results, health data, or academic and training 
certificates online, available at all times.”219 To tie this information to 
individuals, each person would receive a unique code called a 
“blockchain hash” that would be imprinted on every digital transaction 
as a personal identifier.220 While similar to a SSN in that consumers 
would be required to keep their blockchain hash as a sort of key,221 this 
information could be readily accessible and controlled by 
individuals.222 In contrast, most personal information, like SSNs, is 
 
 214. Don Tapscott, How Blockchains Could Change the World, MCKINSEY & CO.  
(May 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-blockchains-could-
change-the-world [https://perma.cc/9SV6-UR6Z].  
 215. See Nathaniel Popper, What Is Bitcoin? All About the Mysterious Digital Currency, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/business/all-about-bitcoin-the-
mysterious-digital-currency.html [https://perma.cc/QBH9-WVR3] (describing how the 
anonymous creation of a Bitcoin address allows a seller to accept Bitcoin payments).  
 216. Tapscott, supra note 214. 
 217. Michael Mainelli, Blockchain Could Help Us Reclaim Control of Our Personal Data, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/smart-ledgers-can-help-us-reclaim-
control-of-our-personal-data [https://perma.cc/75TL-XPNS]. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Nafeesa Syeed & Elizabeth Dexheimer, The White House and Equifax Agree: Social 
Security Numbers Should Go, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/ 2017-10-03/white-house-and-equifax-agree-social-security-numbers-should-go 
[https://perma.cc/45QZ-WYC5]. 
 221. Syeed and Dexheimer described how such a system might work: 
[T]he government could issue each person a public key and private key. If people were 
to open a bank account, for instance, they could provide their public key—instead of a 
Social Security number—and the bank would send a message that could only be 
decrypted using their private key. If the private key gets compromised, the government 
could easily issue another one.  
Id.  
 222.  See Mainelli, supra note 217 (envisioning a system in which individuals would always 
control access to their personal valuable documents through a cryptographic key).  
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currently stored using large centralized systems. Once these systems 
are hacked, the entire database of information becomes available. 
Equifax suffered from this very problem.223 The switch to blockchain 
technology makes the distributed ledger system arguably safer because 
hackers would have to target and decode each individual encrypted 
ledger to access the contents of this information.224 
Estonia provides an instructive example. For several years, the 
government of Estonia has been using a similar distributed ledger 
system called e-Estonia.225 Every citizen in Estonia has a nationally-
issued Estonia ID card for keeping track of public, financial, medical 
and emergency services, as well as driving, paying taxes online, and e-
voting.226 Instead of keeping a national ID number or driver’s license 
number in a centralized database, the Estonia ID card uses a 
blockchain-like distributed ledger system.227 This gives individuals 
greater control over their personal information and allows them to 
access their encrypted data electronically.228  
In the U.S., several states have embraced blockchain technology. 
For example, recently, “legislators amended Arizona’s Electronic 
Transactions Act (the AETA) to clarify that ‘electronic records, 
electronic signatures, and smart contract terms secured through 
blockchain technology and governed under UCC Articles 2, 2A and 7 
will be considered to be in an electronic form and to be an electronic 
signature under AETA.’”229 Nevada and Vermont have passed similar 
 
 223. See Seth Fiegerman, Why the Equifax Breach Makes You Feel So Helpless, CNN (Sept. 
8, 2017, 1:25 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/08/technology/business/equifax-breach-
helpless/index.html [https://perma.cc/6HLH-MVZV] (recognizing Virginia Senator Mark 
Warner’s comment that Congress “needs to rethink data protection policies, so that enterprises 
such as Equifax have fewer incentives to collect large, centralized sets of highly sensitive data”). 
 224. Id. But see Raja Raman & Mahesh Mangnaik, Blockchain Can Transform the World, But 
Is It Fool-Proof?, HUFFINGTON POST: INDIA (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.in/raja-
raman/blockchain-can-transform-the-world-but-is-it-fool-proof_a_21660586/ [https://perma.cc/ 
HZE5-427W] (arguing that software risks remain and individuals’ keys may still be stolen).  
 225. Joyce Shen, e-Estonia: The Power and Potential of Digital Identity, THOMSON REUTERS: 
ANSWERS ON (Dec. 20, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/e-estonia-power-
potential-digital-identity/ [https://perma.cc/AUZ3-8MC2].  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Vivienne Walt, Is This Tiny European Nation a Preview of Our Tech, FORTUNE  
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/27/estonia-digital-life-tech-startups/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7MMV-TVSG] (“[F]or example, Finns and Estonians can visit doctors in the other country and 
automatically call up their medical records—all stored online.”). 
 229. Riley T. Svikhart, Blockchain’s Big Hurdle, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 103 (2017) 
(quoting Jeffrey Neuburger, Arizona Passes Groundbreaking Blockchain and Smart Contract 
Law–State Blockchain Laws on the Rise, PROSKAUER: NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG  
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amendments,230 and a blockchain-based birth registry and ID system is 
currently being considered in Illinois.231 The Illinois Blockchain 
Initiative would create a “self-sovereign” identity for Illinois citizens 
on a distributed ledger.232 It would store government-verified 
attributes, such as legal name, date of birth, sex, and blood type, for 
each person at birth.233 The result is that “[b]usinesses and governments 
will be able to verify and authenticate citizens by requesting encrypted 
access to [their electronically stored information]. This minimizes the 
need for entities to establish, maintain, and rely upon their own 
proprietary databases of identity information.”234 Across the U.S., such 
an initiative, like the one in Illinois, would be unprecedented.  
New mechanisms for storing personal information would enable 
individuals to constantly access and monitor this data. As in Estonia, 
such changes would better facilitate citizens efficient interactions with 
the state, as well as companies that requested consumer information. 
In addition, by enabling consumers to decide when to release their 
information to these companies, citizens would be able to track how 
their data was used. And, following the Equifax breach, legislators 
have proposed giving consumers the opportunity to opt-out of the 
credit reporting industry.235 This parallels the conversation surrounding 
the adoption of blockchain technology. Both concepts seek to put 
consumers back in control of their own information.  
A blockchain-based system does face legal and infrastructure 
challenges. Like biometrics, blockchain is tied into the larger legal issue 
of identity management.236 Individuals must willingly provide personal 
 
(Apr. 20, 2017), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2017/04/20/arizona-passes-groundbreaking-
blockchain-and-smart-contract-law-state-blockchain-laws-on-the-rise/ [https://perma.cc/FHR8-
JTD2]). 
 230. Id.  
 231. See Mainelli, supra note 217 (pointing out that Illinois is testing a blockchain-based birth 
registry/ID system).  
 232. Illinois Partners with Evernym to Launch Birth Registration Pilot, ILL. BLOCKCHAIN 
INITIATIVE (Aug. 31, 2017), https://illinoisblockchain.tech/illinois-partners-with-evernym-to-
launch-birth-registration-pilot-f2668664f67c [https://perma.cc/9KV4-7E53]. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Uchill, supra note 191.  
 236. Identity management “involves two fundamental processes[,]” identification and 
authentication. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Solving the Legal Challenges in Verifying Online Identity, 
8 SCITECH L. 10, 11 (2011). Identification is “the process of verifying certain identity attributes 
about a person and issuing an identity credential to reflect those attributes.” Authentication is 
“the process of later verifying that a particular person presenting that credential and claiming to 
be that previously identified person is, in fact, such person.” Id. 
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information to identity providers, like governments, and trust them to 
better utilize this information through blockchain rather than through 
the existing system. In the U.S., the government would be required to 
play a major role in devising, storing, and monitoring this new 
blockchain-based system. There may be an initial backlash from 
consumers because of potential privacy questions. While the U.S. 
maintains less stringent privacy regulations than places like the EU,237 
there is a strong legal tradition of upholding privacy rights.238 Even if 
proposals like the Illinois Blockchain Initiative are successfully 
implemented for newborns, any new identity system based on 
blockchain will likely face an uphill legal battle from the rest of 
society.239  
Scaling this project across the U.S. would also face significant 
hurdles. Estonia is a small nation with a population of just 1.3 million.240 
Unlike the U.S.’ mix of federal and state laws developed over hundreds 
of years, Estonia had the opportunity to rebuild its entire identity 
infrastructure after the fall of the U.S.S.R.241 This meant that Estonia 
could utilize the latest digital technology in all facets of society—from 
creating reliable identification systems to providing free Wi-Fi as a 
basic human right.242  
While not an insignificant transition, the prospect of altering the 
Social Security number system has been gaining traction since the 
Equifax breach. During former Equifax CEO Richard Smith’s 
testimony before Congress, he said, “What is a better way to identify 
consumers in our country in a very secure way? I think that way is 
something different than an SSN, a date of birth and a name.”243 These 
statements have been echoed by the Trump administration, which has 
called on federal departments and agencies to consider replacing the 
existing system.244 The reality is that Social Security numbers have 
become an antiquated means of personal identification and a new 
reliable method of identification is a matter of profound necessity. 
 
 237. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text for a brief introduction to the GDPR. 
 238. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890) (making a seminal argument about the American tradition of privacy). 
 239. See, e.g., Tom Kulik, Why Blockchain And The GDPR Collide Over Your Personal Data, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2EHRAL9 [https://perma.cc/AJG3-GSPF]. 
 240. Walt, supra note 228.  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Syeed & Dexheimer, supra note 220. 
 244. Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
“Data breach” has become a common phrase in the American 
public’s lexicon. And for good reason—breaches are increasing not 
only in frequency, but also in scale, with the potential to adversely 
affect every U.S. citizen. Consumers and shareholders of companies 
will likely continue filing lawsuits in response to these breaches. Some 
may succeed based on novel legal theories and relentless class-action 
lawsuits.245 Yet, many will flounder at the initial standing and pleading 
stages.246 While states like California, New York, and Massachusetts 
are at the forefront of strengthening state-specific data privacy laws, a 
unified federal law on the scale of the EU’s GDPR is a better 
alternative than the existing patchwork. 
Accordingly, Congress must pass a comprehensive piece of data 
privacy legislation. A national data law is a better alternative to the 
existing patchwork of state laws and will help set minimum security 
standards for collecting, storing, and using consumers’ data. The U.S. 
government has the infrastructure to create a proactive public solution, 
like HIPAA and GLBA. If the FTC’s cybersecurity powers are 
simultaneously expanded, the agency would help implement, regulate, 
and enforce this legislation.  
Additionally, as the national conversation shifts to concerns 
regarding personal identity and restoring consumers’ control over their 
data, phasing out SSNs is one example of an attainable solution. 
Another option is reexamining the concept of PII altogether. The 
Illinois Blockchain Initiative hints at the future of secure and reliable 
personal information storage using a blockchain-based system.247 As of 
publication, blockchain appears to be the solution du jour for many 
intractable technological issues. Regardless of blockchain’s longevity, 
it is undeniable that the currently employed system in the U.S based 
on a rudimentary nine-digit pin code is inherently flawed and 
unsustainable. These solutions are thus designed to provide potential 
alternatives and help reframe our collective understanding of PII. Now, 
it is up to legislators and citizens to demand that these essential changes 
come to fruition.  
 
 245. See supra notes 68 & 122 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 69, 73, 87 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
